One of the reasons the collective approach fits more well into the legislative process in Washington than in Canberra is that, if there are differences of law in Canberra, the real negotiators are generally representatives of the government on the one hand and representatives of the non-state majority in the Senate on the other. Negotiations at a conference between members and senators in Canberra would largely obscure the role of government and exaggerate the independent role of participating members. In Washington, on the other hand, the president is an interested observer, or even a de facto participant in conference negotiations, but the members of the House of Representatives and Senate conference committee are autonomous actors who have their own interests and preferences and are willing to lobby for their satisfaction.  However, from time to time, the majority party of the Senate may have its own motivation to rely on an exchange of amendments rather than to send a bill to a conference committee if the final agreement on the bill introduced by the majority contained elements that would violate the limitations of the content of conference reports. In principle, for example, conference participants must resolve any disagreement between the two houses by concluding an agreement that goes within the scope of the differences between their positions. To take the simplest, obviously hypothetical example, When the House of Representatives proposes to use $5.00 for a purpose, and the Senate is proposing $10.00 for the same purpose, conference participants can agree on $5.00, $7.50 or $10.00, but they should not agree on $2.00 or $12.00, as the two amounts would be out of the scope of differences between the positions of the House of Representatives and those of the House of Representatives. Senate. In addition, participants should not propose amendments to the provisions that both chambers have already approved, and conference participants should not, in their report, make recommendations on a subject that has not been addressed in the version of the bill they sent to the conference, nor in the version of the House of Representatives or Senate bill. All of these restrictions apply to conference reports, but not to amendments that are sent between houses.  50.
South Africa`s experience suggests that institutional design alone may not yield the desired result. The political context in which a bicameral parliament operates largely determines whether a second chamber appears as an effective “sober second thought arena” and positions itself as a house working for or against sub-national interests.